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SENATOR/ATTORNEY-GENERAL SAXBE AND THE
"INELIGIBILITY CLAUSE" OF THE CONSTITU-
TION: AN ENCROACHMENT UPON
SEPARATION OF POWERS
DANIEL H. POLLITTt
The generation of men who framed and established our Constitu-
tion was well aware that "the votes of members of Parliament had been
bought, with money or office by nearly every minister who had been
at the head of affairs"; and that this practice of "parliamentary corrup-
tion!' was freely and sometimes shamefully applied throughout the
American war."1  The framers did not want this practice to continue
here, and consequently wrote an "ineligibility" and an "incompatibility"
clause into article 1, section 6 of the Constitution.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under
the authority of the United States, which shall have been created,
or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during
such Time; and no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance
in Office.
This clause had its origin in a strong desire to avoid the example of
England and in an even stronger belief in the principle of separation
of powers.2 George Mason pronounced during the constitutional con-
vention that this curb on the Executive power to appoint was "the cor-
nerstone on which our liberties depend-and if we strike it out we
are erecting a fabric for our destruction."3
Despite the passion and heated debate that preceded the enact-
ment of this clause, it has lain practically dormant for almost two hun-
dred years." Interest was revived in 1973 when President Nixon ap-
t Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. The author would
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1. 2 G. Curns, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOpiTION OF THE
CONSTrIUION OF THE UNrrEn STATEs 242-43 (1858) (emphasis added).
2. Reservists Comm. To Stop War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 835 (D.D.C.
1971).
3. 1 M. FAiRAND, Tim Rcoiws OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON OF 1787, at 381(1911).
4. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam) is the only case arising
under the "ineligibility" clause, and there the Supreme Court avoided decision on the
merits by dismissing it for lack of "standing." See text accompanying notes 66-70 infra.
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pointed Senator William Saxbe to be his fourth Attorney General. On
the face of the Constitution, Saxbe was "ineligible" for the appoint-
ment. He was elected to the Senate from Ohio in 1968, and, during
his term of office, Congress had increased the salary of the Attorney
General from 35,000 dollars -to 60,000 dollars per annum.6 However,
there was an "end run" around the Constitution. Congress rolled back
the Attorney General's salary to 35,000 dollars and the Senate then
confirmed the nomination by the overwhelming vote of seventy-five to
ten.6 Reference was repeatedly made during the Senate debate to the
1909 appointment of Senator Philander Knox to be the Secretary of
State. Congress had increased the salary of that office during the time
for which Senator Knox was elected, and the Congress oblingly rolled
back the salary to pre-existing levels to remove any impediment to his
appointment. An Assistant Attorney General gave the "unofficial
opinion" that -the ineligibility clause did not bar the appointment. He
reasoned that "the sole purpose" of the clause was to destroy the ex-
pectation of a legislator that "he would enjoy the newly created emol-
uments" and that, if "no such hope can exist" because the increased
salary "is made and then unmade," the case "falls outside of the pur-
pose of the law and is not within the law."'7 In other words, those who
Reservists Comm. to Stop War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), was the first
case filed under the "incompatability" clause. Legal scholars, apparently, have had no
interest in the clause, as the law reviews are barren of any discourse on the subject.
5. The increase came into effect under the provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 359 (1970).
This provision allows a salary increase to take effect thirty days after recommendation
by the President. President Nixon recommended the increase on January 15, 1969. 34
Fed. Reg. 2241 (1969).
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 35, cols. 4-8. This was not the first time the
Nixon Administration ran afoul of the ineligibility clause of the Constitution. Donald
Rumsfeld was appointed from the House of Representatives to be Director of the Office
of Economic Opportunity, despite the fact that the salary for the director had been in-
creased while Mr. Rumsfeld was a legislator. President Nixon sought to avoid the issue
by paying Mr. Rumsfeld nothing as Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity,
and 42,500 dollars as an "assistant to the President." Id., Nov. 2, 1973, at 22, cols,
5-6.
Melvin R. Laird took the oath of office as a member of the House of Representa-
tives on January 3, 1969. President Nixon appointed him Secretary of Defense, despite
the fact that a salary increase for that office was to take effect on March 1 of that year
unless vetoed by the Congress. Attorney General Ramsey Clark advised that the ap-
pointment was lawful (despite the increase in emoluments "during the time" for which
Laird "was elected") because the salary increase was tentative as of the time of the ap-
pointment. 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 36 (Jan. 3, 1969); see text accompanying notes
90-95 infra.
7. 43 CONG. REc. 2403 (1909). But see text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
Apart from the merits of this "unofficial opinion" by an assistant attorney general, the
Philander Knox situation is of limited precedential value. President Taft, unlike Presi-
dent Nixon, made no public announcement of his intention to nominate the Senator
prior to the enactment of the law rolling back the increased emolument. This permitted
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favored Saxbe (and earlier, Philander Knox) would accommodate a
presidential appointment 'by reading the clause to mean that a Con-
gressman or Senator may [instead of "shall not"], during the time for
which he was elected," 'be appointed to any civil office . -.. the emol-
uments whereof shall have been increased during such time' provided
only that the increase in emolument is not available to the appointee
'during such time.' "8
This is a far -too narrow reading of the Constitution. "Parliamen-
tary corruption" is a two-way street; for every "corruptee" -there must
be a "corruptor." The ineligibility clause does indeed destroy the ex-
pectation that a Representative or Senator might have that he would
enjoy the newly created office or the newly created emoluments, but
the Constitution does far more. Legislators are incapacitated from pro-
motion to executive offices because otherwise "their eligibility to offices
would give too much influence to the executive."'1 The ineligibility
clause is aimed at incapacitating the Executive, not the individual mem-
bers of the Congress, all for the underlying purpose of preserving the
independence of the Congress and the President, each from -the
the other.""
Those who framed the Constitution knew from the British expe-
rience that, if the Executive was left at liberty to purchase votes "by
the inducements of money or office," conscience might become "false
to duty, and corruption, having once entered the body politic, may be
Taft supporters in the House to maintain that there was no constitutional issue involved,
that the issue was simply an economy measure.
Despite this, and all of the pressures that a newly elected President and a majority
party could command, the bill reducing the salary passed the House by a vote of 173
to 116, with 90 Representatives abstaining. 43 CoNG. REC., supra, at 2415. In the Sen-
ate, the issue was never raised during the enactment of the "roll back bill" or during
the subsequent confirmation. This prompted Congressman Clark in the House to pro-
claim that "senatorial courtesy, . . . overrides the Constitution, laws, and every other
thing known among men." Id. at 2415.
8. E. CORWIN, THE CONSTrUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 20 (1948).
9. "Public morality. . . condemns with equal severity and equal justice both the
giver and the receiver in every transaction that can be regarded as a purchase of votes
upon particular measures or occasions, whatever may have been the consideration or mo-
tive of the bargain." 2 G. CuRTis, supra note 1, at 244-45.
10. The words are those of Roger Sherman of Connecticut during the debate on
this Clause. A. PRnscorr, DRAFTING THE FEDERAL CoNsTrrurnON 764 (1968).
11. Corwin writes that the clause derives from a repudiation of the British "Cabi-
net System" in which the executive power is placed in the hands of the leaders of the
controlling party in the House of Commons. In contrast, the "ineligibility" and "incom-
patibility" clauses confirm and support the doctrine of the separation of powers in which
the business of legislation and that of administration proceed largely in formal inde-
pendence of each other. See E. CoRwIN, supra note 8, at 20-21.
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employed to effect bad ends as well 'as good."' 2  On ,the other hand,
the Framers did not want to penalize those who served in the legisla-
'ive bodies by totally denying them opportunity for higher office. This
total bar, it was thought, might deny Congress the services "of the most
capable citizens" by eliminating the possibility of subsequent appoint-
ment to "the higher or more lucrative offices of state." The history
of the constitutional debate is an effort to prevent the evils of these
opposite mischiefs. 13
I. THB CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES
On May 25, 1787, delegates from the original states organized a
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and remained in almost con-
stant session until September 17 to frame our Constitution. Work
began in earnest on May 29 when Edmund Randolph submitted the
so-called Virginia Plan for organizing a federal government. Most of
the subsequent discussion concerned alternatives and amendments to
the Virginia Plan.
Randolph's fourth and fifth resolutions provided that the members
of the National Legislature would be ineligible to hold "any office," be
it state or federal, during the elected "term of service" and for an unde-
termined period of time thereafter.1 4  Debate began on these propo-
sals on June 22 when Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts moved to
strike out the ineligibility clause insofar as it barred appointment to of-
fices created "under -the national government."'' 5 He considered the
12. 2 G. CtrnTs, supra note 1, at 247. In addition to the British experience, the
Framers also were aware of the experiences of the Congress that had the sole power
of appointment to offices under the Articles of Confederation. Complaints had been
made of the frequency with which the Congress had filled these offices with its own
members. The original drafts of the Constitution provided that the legislative body
would have the power of appointment; thus, there was a need to guard against the poten-
tial abuse if the members of the Congress were left at liberty to appoint each other to
offices of their own creation. Id. at 248-50.
13. Id. at 248.
14. The Randolph Resolutions read as follows:
4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National Legisla-
ture . . . be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under
the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the
functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of
after its expiration.
5. Resd. that the members of the second branch of the National Legis-
lature ...be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to
the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and for the
space of after the expiration thereof.
1 M. FARRAD, supra note 3, at 20-21,
J5. 2 i4I. qt 379,
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ban on appointments to be both "unnecessary and injurious."'"
George Mason of Virginia rose in opposition to this motion. He
pointed out that in England the "power of the crown" had "remarkably
increased" during the last century through "the sole power of .appoint-
ing the increased officers of government," and he concluded that this
ineligibility clause is "the cornerstone on which our liberties depend.""'
Pierce Butler of South Carolina echoed the sentiment that it was the
Executive power of appointment that caused and resulted in parliamen-
tary "venality and corruption."18
Rufus King of Massachusetts spoke for the Gorham amendment
and against the Randolph "ineligibility" resolution. He thought this
"restriction on the members would discourage merif' and that it "would
also give a pretext to the Executive for bad appointments, and he might
always plead this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made."' 9
James Wilson of Pennsylvania also rose to support the proposed
Gorham amendment, because "[s]trong reasons must induce me to dis-
qualify a good man from office.120 Admitting the potential for "cabal
and intrigue between the executive and legislative bodies" -that could
exist without the ineligibility clause, he nonetheless thought it more im-
portant "to hold forth every honorable inducement -for men of abilities
to enter the service of the public." He then put this case: "Suppose
a war break out and a number of your best military characters were
members; must we lose the benefit of -their services? Had this been
the case in the beginning of the war, what would have been our situ-
ation?-and what has happened may happen again."21
Alexander Hamilton also spoke in support of the Gorham amend-
ment. He too confessed to a danger "where men are capable of
holding two offices." But he saw the need for a strong Executive, with
16. Id. at 375. Mr. Gorham remarked that "[i]t was true abuses had been dis-
played in G.B. [Great Britain] but no one cd. [could] say how far they might have
contributed to preserve the due influence of the Gov't nor what might have ensured in
case the contrary theory had been tried." Id. at 375-76.
17. Id. at 380-81. Mr. Mason asked: "Why has the power of the crown so re-
markably increased the last century? A stranger, by reading their laws, would suppose
it considerably diminished; and yet, by the sole power of appointing the increased offi-
cers of government, corruption pervades every town and village in the kingdom." Id.
18. Id. at 379. Mr. Butler said in full: "We have no way of judging of mankind
but by experience. Look at the history of the government of Great Britain, where there
is a very flimsy exclusion-Does it not ruin their government? A man takes a seat in
parliament to get an office for himself or friends, or both; and this is the great source
from which flows its great venality and corruption." Id.
19. Id. at 376.
20. Id. at 379.
21. Id. at 380.
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the power to appoint Congressman and Senators to high office, because,
as he put it, "[o]ur prevailing passions are ambition and interest" and the
Executive might need "to avail himself of those passions" to induce
the legislature to act "for the public good." He was against "all exclu-
sions and refinements, except only in this case; that, when a member
takes his seat, he would vacate every other office."22  The Gorham
motion was put to a vote, and defeated, four states in favor, four states
against, and three states divided.23
James Madison of Virginia then offered a compromise resolution,
precluding a member of the legislature only from those offices "which
may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature."24  He
"supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices, and increase of
salaries, were the evils most experienced" and that if the "door was
shut agst. [against] them" it might properly be left open for the
appointment of members to other offices "as an encouragement to the
Legislative service. '25  He described his amendment "as a middle
ground" between an eligibility in all cases and an absolute disqualifica-
tion in all cases. He stressed the need for securing the services of "the
most capable citizens" and argued "from experience" that the Legisla-
ture of Virginia would have been without its best members had "they
been ineligible to Congress, to the Government and honorable offices
of the State." '26
There was immediate opposition to Madison's proposed "middle
ground," largely based on fear of an all-powerful Executive. Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts pointed out that "we have . . . endeavored to
keep distinct the three great branches of government; but if we agree
to this motion, it must be destroyed by admitting the legislators . . .
to be too much influenced by the executive, in looking up to him for
offices.12 7  Pierce Butler of South Carolina agreed that the Madison
proposal "does not go far enough," and then expounded how George
H had won his way over Parliament: "To some of the opposers he
gave pensions-others offices, and some, to put them out of the house
22. Id. at 381-82. Earlier in the debates Benjamin Franklin had remarked in a
similar vein that "there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs
of men. They are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money."
Id. at 82.
23. Id. at 377.
24. Id. at 380.
25. Id. at 386.
26. Id. at 388-89.
27. Id. at 393.
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of commons, he made lords. 28  George Mason of Virginia also "en-
larged on the abuses & corruption in the British Parliament, connected
with the appointment of its members, He cd. [could] not suppose that
a sufficient number of Citizens could not be found who would be ready,
without the inducement of eligibility to offices, to undertake the Legis-
lative service."29 Daniel Jenifer also opposed the Madison motion be-
cause, in Maryland "senators are appointed for 5 years and they can
hold no other office. This circumstance gives them the greatest con-
fidence of the people."30
Charles Pinkney of South Carolina then moved to strike that part
of the clause which disqualified a -member of the federal legislature
from appointment to an office "established by a particular state." He
argued "from the inconvenience" which such a restriction would expose
the states wishing for the services, as well as "from the smallness of
the object to be attained by the restriction."31 Sherman of Connecticut
seconded the motion with the comment that "it wd. [would] seem that
we are erecting a Kingdom at war with itself." The motion was adop-
ted by a vote of eight states in favor with three opposed."
At that stage of the debate, it was not yet determined whether
federal appointments would be made by the legislative, by the Execu-
tive, or by both acting together; and many opposed the Madison "mid-
dle ground" because it would do nothing to eliminate "the shameful
partiality of the legislature to its own members."3  Rutledge of South
Carolina, for example, "was for preserving the Legislature as pure as
possible, by shutting the door against appointments of its own members
to offices, which was one source of its corruption." '4 The Madison
amendment was put to a vote, -and defeated with eight states opposed,
two in favor, and one state divided. 5
A final motion was then made to amend the clause by eliminating
the Provision that would have made legislators ineligible for appoint-
ment not only during their elected term, but also "for the space of one
year after its expiration." Mason spoke against this amendment,
because "places may be promised at the close of their duration, and
28. Id. at 391.
29. Id. at 387.
30. Id. at 394.
31. Id. at 386.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 387 (statement of George Mason).
34. Id. at 386.
35. Id. at 390.
19741
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* . . a dependency may be made.",, Hamilton spoke against the
motion because "the clause may be evaded many ways. Offices may
be held by proxy-they may be procured by friends, etc." Rutledge
admitted the possibility of evasion, but said "this is no argument against
shutting the door as close as possible." The motion was defeated by
a vote of six states to four, with one divided. 37
The original Randolph Resolutions thus survived all proposed
amendments, other than the one that permitted members of the federal
legislative bodies to accept appointments to offices "established by a
particular state." In late June the amended version was sent to the
Committee of Detail for "Stylistic Changes," and that Committee
reported the clause back to the Convention as proposed article VI, sec-
tion 9 of the Constitution: "The members of each House shall be in-
eligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of
the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be
elected; and the members of the senate shall be ineligible to, and in-
capable of holding any such office for one year afterwards." 38
The debate that resumed on August 14 closely paralleled the
earlier discussions. Mr. Pinkney of South Carolina began with the ob-
servation that the ineligibility clause was "inconvenient, because the
Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest men" and he "hoped
to see that body become a School of Public Ministers, a nursery of States-
men."39  His immediate proposal, however, was a substitute res-
olution which would bar legislators from office only when "they...
receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind" with the further
provision that "the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats re-
spectively. '40 This proposal would have minimized the "parliamentary
corruptions" caused by those legislators whose votes can be bought by
"avarice, the love of money," but would have done nothing to ease the
problem concerning those legislators whose votes can be purchased by
"ambition, the love of power. ' 41 The Pinkney substitute was defeated
by a vote of five states in favor, five opposed, and one state divided. 2
36. Id. at 394 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 180. The Committee on Style thus eliminated the ineligibility of mem-
bers of the House "for one year" after their term of office expired.
39. Id. at 283.
40. Id. at 284.
41. See the discussion by Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton at text ac-
companying note 22 supra.
42. 2 M. FARRA ND, supra note 3, at 283. The defeat of the Pinkney proposal is
certainly relevant to the argument made during the Philander Knox (and the William
[Vol. 53
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General debate then resumed on the clause, with the opponents
speaking against any limitation whatsoever on the power of -the Execu-
tive to appoint members of the Legislature to high office. John Mercer
of Maryland thought this power was absolutely necessary for effective
government. "Governm[en]ts," he said, "can only be maintained by
force or influence" and since the "Executive has not force" the clause
depriving him of influence "by rendering the members of the [Legisla-
ture] ineligible to Executive offices" would make him "a mere phan-
tom of authority."'43 James Wilson of Pennsylvania also spoke against
any limitation which would render the 'members of Congress "ineligible
to Natl. [National] offices," and he was "far from thinking the ambition
which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ignoble or culpable
one." 44 On the other hand, Hugh Williamson commented that "he had
scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N. Carolina
which could not be traced up to office hunting," 4 and Roger Sherman
of Connecticut stoutly maintained that "the Constitution shd. [should]
lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. ' 46
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania then "put the case of a war,
and the Citizen the most capable of conducting it, happening to be a
member of the Legislature." He moved to insert a provision which
would except from the ban on appointment "offices in the army or
navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated. 47 Edmund Ran-
dolph, who authored the original Virginia Plan, spoke generally against
"opening a door for influence or corruption," but admitted great weight
to the argument which related to the case of war, and a co-existing in-
capacity of the fittest commanders to be employed." He agreed to the
exception proposed by Mr. Morris.48
Mr. Pinkney then urged a general postponement of further debate
on the clause pending further refinement in the Constitution concern-
Saxbe) debate that the "sole purpose" of the clause was to deny any expectation that
the legislator might enjoy an increased emolument. See text accompanying note 7
supra.
43. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 284. Mr. Mercer continued as follows: "All
Gov. must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France-but 200,000 janisaries
of power that govern that Kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence then
must be substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done if the members of
the Legislature should be ineligible of offices of State... ." Id. at 289.
44. Id. at 288.
45. Id. at 287. The actual wording of this proposal is unclear; see 1 id. at xvii-
xix.
46. 2 id. at 287.
47. Id. at 289.
48. Id. at 290.
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ing the distribution between the Senate and the Executive of the
appointive power. This was agreed to, and the Randolph proposal was
sent to a Committee of Eleven (composed of one member from each
state) along with other unfinished business.
On September 1 the Committee of Eleven reported for further
consideration the following draft, expressing the sentiment of the
states: "The Members of each House shall be ineligible to any civil
office under the authority of the United States during the time for which
they shall respectively be elected-And no Person holding any office
under the United States shall be a Member of either House during his
continuance in office. 49
By this stage of the convention, it was established that the signifi-
cant appointive power would be lodged in the Executive with certain
lesser appointive power reserved to the Congress." The proposed
draft was significant then, in that it continued the ban against the ap-
pointment of "The Members of each House" during the time for which
they shall be elected. This clearly reflects the expressed fears against
"Executive influence." The proposed draft was also significant in that
it eliminated the ban against appointment to military office, with the
new provision against dual office holding-the so-called "incompati-
bility clause."'"
Mr. Pinkney was the first to speak on the proposals. He favored
the "incompatibility clause," but thought this insufficient to cure the
mischief. He proposed, for a second time, 2 his amendment that the
members of each House should be incapable of holding only those of-
fices for which they received "any salary, fees, or emoluments," and
made reference to the "policy of the Romans, in making the temple
of virtue the road to the temple of fame." 8 This proposal was defea-
49. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
50. U.S. CoNsr. art. 11, § 2 provides that the President "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Coun-
selors, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
law. . . ." This takes care of all of the important officers. The Constitution then con-
tinues to read: "but the Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments."
51. This juxtaposition of exclusions and inclusions clearly contemplates that a
member of either House who accepts the appointment to a military office, thereby for-
feits his membership in that House. See Reservists Comm. To Stop War v. Laird, 323
F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
52. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
53. 2 M. FAPRD, supra note 3, at 489-90.
120 [Vol. 5:3
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ted by a vote of eight states to two."
Rufus King of Massachusetts then proposed an amendment that
would bar the members of each House only from those offices created
during their respective terms of office. He said that this would make
only a slight inroad into the principle of "incapacity," because his
amendment would "exclude the members of the first Legislature" and
"most of the Offices wd. [would] then be created."55 Sherman of Con-
necticut was in principle still "for entirely incapacitating members of
the Legislature" as -their eligibility to offices "would give too much in-
fluence to the Executive." But apparently sensing that the King
amendment might pass, he urged that "incapacity ought at least to be
extended to cases where salaries should be increased, as well as
created, during the term of the member."5  The King amendment,
as thus modified by Sherman, was restated by Williamson of North Car-
olina and enacted by a vote of five states in favor, four states against,
and one state divided.5 7  This was the "middle ground" earlier pro-
posed by Madison, and then decisively rejected.5 8  In any event, the
Framers quickly agreed to the "last clause rendering a Seat in the Leg-
islature and an office incompatible,"59 and the debate was at an end.
The Constitution then was sent to the states for ratification or re-
jection. The recorded debate, while limited, supports the conclusion
that the clause was entered to affirm and reinforce the doctrine of sep-
aration of powers by denying the Executive a power to influence the
legislators with promises of appointment to high office.
In Virginia, the opponents thought the clause "entirely imperfect,"
and reference was made to the British House of Commons in which
"dependents and fortune-hunters . . . are willing to sell the interest
of their constituents to the crown. 16 0 These opponents proposed a total
ban on appointment of legislators to any office, during or after their
terms. Patrick Henry argued that the "hope or expectation of offices"
is the "principle source of corruption" and that the ban on appoint-
54. Id. at 490.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 492.
58. See text accompanying notes 24 & 33 supra. Curtis attributes the shift in
sentiment to the fact that "the mischiefs most apprehended at the time of Mr. Madison's
proposition were in a great degree prevented by taking from the legislature the power
of appointing to office; and that this modification" made the compromise possible. 2
G. CURTis, supra note 1, at 251.
59. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 492.
60. 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTr=UTION 375 (1836).
1974]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment only during the term of office was inadequate because the legis-
lators might experience "hope or expectation of offices or emoluments"
after their term of office expired." James Madison admitted that the
clause was "a mean between two extreme," but argued that "ineligi-
bility" limited to a term of office was necessary, because otherwise the
Henry proposal for a permanent ban on appointment would "prevent
those who had served their country with the greatest fidelity and ability
from being on a par with their fellow-citizens." ' 2
In the New York debate, Alexander Hamilton argued that the in-
eligibility clause was adequate, even "admitting, in the president, a dis-
position to corrupt." He reasoned that the President would have few
such opportunities, because "[mien who have been in the Senate once,
and who have a reasonable hope of a re-election, will not be easily
bought by offices. '63 In Massachusetts, the clause was described as
a "check to ensure the independence of the legislative branch from the
executive branch"; 64 and in Pennsylvania, as a useful tool to prevent
"undue influence" by the Executive on the legislators. Throughout the
debates it was admitted that members of the Congress might be cor-
rupted by the Executive power of appointment, but that it is "an objec-
tion against human nature" and "[tjhe danger is certainly better guarded
against in the proposed system than in any other yet devised."65
The history of the ineligibility and incompatibility clauses shows
that the original purpose of the clause was to protect against legislative
corruption by the executive's appointment power. Although the final
language in the Constitution represents a compromise to prevent total
and permanent exclusion of worthy men from office, it was clearly in-
tended to bar the use of the appointment power to gain influence. It
is designed to prevent the offering of high position as an inducement
61. Id. at 368-69. Mr. Justice Story agreed with the Patrick Henry philosophy
when he wrote that,
the reasons for excluding persons from office who have been concerned in cre-
ating them, or increasing their emoluments are to take away, as far as possi-
ble, any improper bias in the vote of the representative, and to secure to the
constituents some solemn pledge of his disinterestedness. The actual provision,
however, does not go to the extent of the principle; for his appointment is re-
stricted "only during the time for which he was elected," thus leaving in full
force every influence upon his mind, if the period of his election is short, or
the duration of it is approaching its natural termination.
1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTTTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 867 (1858)
(emphasis added).
62. 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 60, at 370.
63. 2 id. at 321.
64. Id. at 85-86.
65. Id. at 508-09.
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to legislators, and was never contemplated as a technicality of salary
scales.
The paucity of authoritative discussion of the clause necessitates
that great weight be placed on its history in determining its application.
The few occasions when the clause was called into question will now
be examined.
I. Ex PARTE ALBERT LEVITT: THE CASE OF
MR. JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK
The Supreme Court has been asked to interpret the clause twice,
once under the ineligibility clause, and once under the incompatibility
clause. In both cases, the Court refused to reach the merits of the case.
Hugo L. Black was elected to the Senate of the United States in
1932 for a six-year term. In March 1937 Congress by law gave to
Justices of the United States Supreme Court the right to retire at age
seventy at a pension equal to their then-existing salary.66 Prior -to this
Act of Congress, Justices who resigned at age 70, but not those who
retired, received a pension equal to the salary they then received.
But there is a difference between retirement and resignation. The
pension of a Justice who resigned (but not the pension of a Justice who
retired) was then subject to income taxation. Moreover, a retired
Justice (but not a Justice who resigned) might be called upon to per-
form certain voluntary judicial duties.Y't In August 1937 Senator Black
was appointed to -the Supreme Court. The appointment was defended
by the argument that the Act of Congress did not "increase the emol-
uments" of the office, and, even if it did, Mr. Black was then only fifty-
one years old, the "emoluments" would not be available to him for
nineteen years, if at all. 68
Albert Levitt filed an original suit in the Supreme Court request-
ing that Mr. Justice Black be required "to show cause" why he should
be permitted to serve as an Associate Justice.69 The Supreme Court
did not reach the merits of the case but dismissed for the lack of a "justic-
iable controversy." It wrote, briefly:
The motion papers disclose no interest upon the part of the
petitioner [Albert Levitt] other than that of a citizen and a member
66. Act of March 1, 1937, ch. 21, §§ 1-2, 54 Stat. 24 (codified as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 371 (1970)).
67. Note, Legality of fustice Black's Appointment to Supreme Court, 37 COLUM.
L. REv. 1212 (1937).
68. E. CoRwN, supra note 8, at 18-19.
69. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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of the bar of this Court. That is insufficient. It is an established
principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial
power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action
he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is
not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all
members of the public.10
Ex parte Levitt was decided in 1937, and the "law of standing"
has evolved greatly during the intervening years. 71 Indeed, the Levitt
rationale was challenged in the first suit ever filed under the incompati-
bility clause, Reservists Committee to Stop War v. Laird." There, an
association of reservists filed suit against the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Plaintiffs asked that
the various Secretaries be required to remove from the reserve rolls
the 117 Senators and Representatives then holding commissions in the
various reserve components.
On the merits, the issue is a simple one. Membership in a mili-
tary component is "incompatible" with membership in Congress be-
cause of the inherent tension between the loyalty a reserve officer owes
to the President as his Commander in Chief and the dispassionate duty
a Congressman owes to the constituents who elected him. Under the
precedents the issues seem totally free from doubt. In 1803 Repre-
sentative John Van Ness was forced to select between his seat in the
House and a commission in the District of Columbia Militia. 73 In 1846
Representative Edward Baker had to choose between his seat in the
House and a commission as a colonel of volunteers from Illinois. 74 In
1864 Representative Frank Blair had to choose between his seat in the
House and a major-generalship in the Tennessee Volunteers. 5 In
1916 -the House Judiciary Committee, upon a directive from the House,
undertook a careful review of the situation and reported that member-
ship in the House was "incompatible" with holding a commission in any
National Guard.7 6
70. Id. at 634.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Associh-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Bar-
low v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971), noted in 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 542 (1972);
85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 507 (1971) and 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 620 (1971).
73. 1 A. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRSENTATIVES 592-93 (1907).
74. Id. at 594-95.
75. Id. at 601-03.
76. H.R. REP. No. 885, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916).
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The more difficult and relevant questions are whether the Reser-
vists Committee (or its members) has "standing" to raise this issue and
whether the issue is "justiciable." District Judge Gesell held that the
plaintiffs did have standing. He reasoned that the incompatibility
clause was designed "to ensure the integrity of a particular form of gov-
ernment, by preventing encroachments upon the separation of pow-
ers,"'77 and hence, "any violation of the Clause" is an injury to all citi-
zens of the United States. Elaborating somewhat, he wrote that
the interest in maintaining independence among the branches
of government is shared by all citizens equally, and since this is
the primary if not the sole purpose of the bar against Congressmen
holding executive office, the interest of plaintiffs as citizens is
undoubtedly one which was intended to be protected by the con-
stitutional provision involved.78
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed -this holding with-
out an opinion. The Supreme Court, however, reversed without reach-
ing the merits, on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked "standing."
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs raised only a "generalized grievance
about the conduct of Government," and expressly reaffirmed Levitt "in
holding that standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest
. . .which is held in common by all members of the public. 7 o
It is thus doubtful that anyone has the necessary standing to chal-
lenge the Saxbe appointment as violative of the ineligibility clause, 0 with
the possible exception of the ten senators who voted against his confir-
77. 323 F. Supp. at 837.
78. Id. at 841 (emphasis added).
79. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop War, 94 S. Ct. 2925, 2930, 2932
(1974).
80. The title of a de facto officer cannot be attacked directly or collaterally. One
is an officer de facto if, like Attorney General Saxbe, he exercises the duties of office
under color of an election or appointment. Note, 37 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 64,
at 1215. Thus, a defendant in a criminal case cannot attack the validity of his convic-
tion on the theory that both the jury and the judge were appointed in violation of a
statute, McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596 (1895); that the presiding judge was
appointed in violation of the Constitution, Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452 (1899); or that
the prosecuting attorney was illegally appointed under state law, United States ex rel.
Doss v. Lindsley, 148 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 858 (1945). Nor
will the defendant in a criminal prosecution under the Selective Service Act be heard
to argue that the members of the local draft board which ordered his induction were
serving illegally because of the statutory prohibition against more than twenty-five years
of service. United States v. Groupp, 333 F. Supp. 242 (D. Me. 1971), af'd on other
grounds, 459 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1972). "The result of the authorities" as the Supreme
Court once held, "is that the title of a person acting with color of authority, even if
he be not a good officer in point of law," is not subject to attack. Ex parte Ward, supra,
at 456.
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mation.8 1 However, the issue might be raised administratively by a
challenge to the payment of the Attorney General's salary by the
General Accounting Office. 2
III. OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
On several occasions, the effects of the ineligibility clause on pres-
idential appointments have been considered by the Attorney General.
In the majority of the reported opinions, a strict construction of the
clause was adopted, forcing rejection of a proposed appointment.
A. Governor Kirkwood. The first such ruling was made by At-
torney General Benjamin Brewster in 1882.83 Governor Kirkwood of
Iowa had been elected to -the Senate for a term that expired on March
3, 1883. In March 1881, two years before his term expired, Kirkwood
resigned from the Senate to accept the position of Secretary of the In-
terior. He subsequently resigned from that office in 1882 to retire to
private life. Thereafter, but prior to March 3, 1883, Congress created
the office of tariff commissioner, and President Chester Arthur desired
to appoint Governor Kirkwood to that position. Attorney General
Brewster advised the President that Governor Kirkwood was disabled
from receiving that appointment because of the bar against the appoint-
ment of a Senator -to any civil office which shall have been created "dur-
ing the time for which he was elected." The Attorney General recited
that:
81. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), in which Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes wrote for the Court that the dissenting members of the Kansas Senate had "a
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes" suffi-
cient to challenge the legality of Kansas' ratification of the "child labor" amendment
to the Constitution. Id. at 438.
Without discussion, the federal courts have assumed the "standing" of the incum-
bent to an appointive position, Padron v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Castro, 142 F.2d 508 (1st
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 791 (1945), and the "standing" of the opposing candi-
date for elected office to challenge the "eligibility" of a legislator for those offices, Ked-
erick v. Heintzleman, 132 F. Supp. 582 (D. Alas. 1955). In each of these cases, the
territorial organic act contained prohibitions that "no member of the legislature shall
hold or be appointed to any office which has been created, or the salary or emoluments
of which have been increased, while he was a member, during the term for which he
was elected . . . ." Id. at 583. In Padron the emoluments of the office had been in-
creased while the new appointee was a member of the legislature. In Kederick the office
had been created while the rival opponent had been a member of the legislature. In
each the federal court held that the ineligibility clause was a bar to the office sought.
82. See text accompanying notes 86, 87, 91 infra.
83. 17 Op. Arr'y GEN. 365 (1882). The Attorney General wrote that he gave
the subject "a serious consideration and a thorough examination" because of the Presi-
dent's "desire to appoint Governor Kirkwood" and "the hope of all the members of the
Cabinet that he would be appointed .... "
SEPARATION OF POWERS
It is unnecessary to consider the question of the policy
which occasioned this constitutional prohibition. I must be con-
trolled exclusively by the positive terms of the provision of the
Constitution. The language is precise and clear, and, in my
opinion, disables him from receiving the appointment. The rule
is absolute, as expressed in the terms of the Constitution, and
behind that I can not go .... 8-
B. Matthew W. Ransom. The second ruling was written by Act-
ing Attorney General Holmes Conrad in 1895.85 Matthew W. Ransom
was elected from North Carolina to the Senate for a term of office
which expired on March 3, 1895. In 1891, early in his term, the Con-
gress increased the salary for those serving in the diplomatic and con-
sular service. On February 23, 1895, near the end of his term, President
Grover Cleveland nominated Senator Ransom as minister plenipoten-
tiary to Mexico. The Senate confirmed the nomination the same day.
Senator Ransom took the oath of office on March 4, the day after his
Senatorial term had expired, and his commission was delivered to him
the following day.
Thereafter, the "Auditor for the state and other Departments"
ruled that Ambassador Ransom was not entitled to a salary because of
the ineligibility clause, and the Secretary of State requested the advice
of the Attorney General on -the matter.86 Attorney General Conrad
agreed with the Auditor that the presidential appointment of a Senator
to any civil office, the emoluments whereof have been increased during
the time for which he was elected, is "a nullity." The Attorney General
then wrote as follows:
It is suggested in your letter that the commission of Mr.
Ransom was not actually signed by the President until the 5th
of March, which was after the expiration of the time for which
Mr. Ransom was elected a Senator in Congress.
But it must be observed that the language of the Constitu-
tion is that "no Senator shall, during the term for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the
United States."
The vital question here, then, would seem -to be, not when
was Mr. Ransom commissioned, but when was he appointed? . . .
I am of opinion, then, that Mr. Ransom's appointment as
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Mexico was
84. Id. at 366.
85. 21 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 211 (1895).
86. Id.
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made on February 23, 1895; that that was during the time for which
he was elected a Senator in Congress, and it appearing from your
letter that it was during that time the emoluments of the office
of minister to Mexico were increased, Mr. Ransom was not,
in my opinion, eligible to appointment to that office.87
C. William S. Kenyon. The third opinion was written by
Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty, and he too gave the constitu-
tional language a very strict construction. s8 William S. Kenyon was
elected to the Senate for a term that expired on March 4, 1919. Dur-
ing his first term in office, Congress increased the salary of the Judg-
es of the Circuit Court. In 1918 Senator Kenyon was reelected to a
second term of office which began on March 4, 1919. In 1922, during
Kenyon's second term in the Senate, President Harding nominated him
to be a United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, and the ap-
pointment was confirmed by the Senate. Thereafter, President War-
ren Harding requested an opinion from the Attorney General "as to
whether or not the provisions of the Constitution make it impossible
for" Senator Kenyon "to qualify" for that office. Attorney General
Daugherty ruled that the appointment was not barred by the Constitu-
tion and wrote as follows:
two things must concur in order to deprive a Senator or a
Representative of his right to appointment to a civil office under
the above-quoted Section of the Constitution, to wit:
(a) Increasing the emoluments of an office; (b) appointing
a Senator or Representative to an office the emoluments of which
had been increased, both occurring during the term which the Sen-
ator or Representative was then serving.
There is no such concurrences of events in the case of Mr.
Kenyon. The emoluments of the office to which he has been
appointed were not increased "during the time for which he was
elected" at the time of his appointment.
If the framers of the Constitution had intended that in case the
emoluments of any office were increased during a term then being
served by a United States Senator such Senator would be precluded
from being appointed to such office during a subsequent term to
which he had been elected, more apt language would have un-
questionably been adopted.89
87. Id. at 213-14. On September 6, 1895, the Treasury Department handed former
Senator Ransom a further setback when it refused to pay his salary from March 4 to
June 30 because "such appointment was prohibited by Section 6, Article 1 of the Consti-
tution, and Mr. Ransom's salary cannot be paid." 2 CoMp. GEM. 129-30 (1895).
88. 33 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 88 (1922).
89. Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
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D. Melvin R. Laird. The final opinion by an Attorney General
was issued on January 3, 1969.90 Melvin Laird was reelected to the
ninety-first Congress, which was to commence on January 3, 1969.
Prior thereto, President-elect Nixon (whose term was to begin on Jan-
uary 20, 1969) announced that he would appoint Laird to be his Sec-
retary of Defense. Laird first wrote the Comptroller General. and then
to Attorney General Ramsey Clark, inquiring advice "as to whether
commencing [his] term as a Member of the House of Representatives
for the 91st Congress would preclude [his] appointment as Secretary
of Defense." '91 The problem arose under the Federal Salary Act of
1967. Under this law, President Lyndon B. Johnson was required to
make any recommendations regarding salary increases for various fed-
eral offices in his Budget message, which was required to reach Con-
gress by January 17. The recommended salary increase, if any, would
take effect on March 1, 1969, unless disapproved by Congress prior to
that time. Under normal practice at the beginning of a new admini-
stration, 2 Melvin Laird would be nominated, confirmed, and appointed
as Secretary of Defense within a few days following the inauguration
of President Nixon, i.e. shortly after January 20; "during the period in
which it remains uncertain whether Congress may disapprove the
Presidential salary recommendations." '93
Attorney General Clark advised Secretary of Defense-designate
Laird that taking his seat in Congress would not preclude the appoint-
ment. He wrote that "[t]he constitutional language prohibits the ap-
pointment of a legislator to an office the compensation of which 'shall
have been' increased prior to the making of such appointment," and
consequently "the ban clearly does not apply to an increase in compen-
sation which is proposed subsequent to the appointment."94 A fortiori,
ruled Attorney General Clark, the ban "is also inapplicable where, as
here, it is possible but not certain at the time of the appointment that
a proposed salary increase for the appointee may receive final approval
at a future date."9 5
If Attorney General Clark was correct, the whole controversy over
the appointment of Hugo Black was wasted motion,96 and Attorney
90. 42 Op. ATrVY GEN. No. 36 (Jan. 3, 1969).
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Id. at 2-3.
94. Id. at 1-2.
95. Id. at 2.
96. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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General Brewster was incorrect when he ruled that Governor Kirkwood
was "disabled" from holding a position created after his resignation
from the Senate but during the time for which he was elected. Attor-
ney General Clark, however, seems to have been in error when he as-
serted that "the constitutional language" prohibits the appointment of
a legislator to an office the compensation of which shall have been in-
creased "prior to the making of such appointment." To the contrary,
the "constitutional language" prohibits the appointment of a legislator
to an office, the compensation of which shall have been increased "dur-
ing the time for which he was elected. '97
Until the very closing days of the Constitutional Convention, the
drafts contained a total ban on the appointment to any office during
the time for which the members of each House "shall respectively be
elected." At that time the Framers adopted two amendments: the
first limited the "ineligibility" to those offices "created during their re-
spective terms of office 9 8 and the second extended the incapacity "to
cases in which salaries should be increased, as well as created, during
the term of the member."9 9 This relaxation of the ineligibility clause
was passed by the narrow vote of five states to four, with one state di-
vided.' 00 Surely the Framers never contemplated that a legislator
would be eligible for Presidential appointment during his term of office
if -the emoluments of that office were increased during the term for
which he was elected but after he had resigned from his legislative
functions. 10' It was simply bad politics and worse law for Melvin Laird
to take his seat in the Congress when he knew he would be appointed
to be the Secretary of Defense vithin a matter of days and that 'the
emoluments of that office would be increased by Congress within a
matter of weeks.
E. Philander Chase Knox. The Attorney General did not issue
an opinion in this case. Assistant Attorney General Russell wrote what
he styled an "unofficial opinion." It is not contained in the bound vol-
umes of the Opinions of the Attorney General, but is found only as
97. See text accompanying note 84 supra.
98. 2 M. FARRA D, supra note 3, at 490-92.
-99. Id.
100. Id.
101. During the debates, George Mason spoke especially against the "dependency"
which "may be made" if legislators may be promised offices to take effect at the close
of their offices. See text accompanying note 37 supra. Mason also stressed the need
for the clause barring appointment during "the time for which they shall respectively




an "appendix" to the floor debate in the Congress.1""
Senator Knox was elected to the Senate for a term -that expired
on March 4, 1911. Early in his term, in 1907, Congress increased the
salary of the Secretary of State from 8,000 dollars to 12,000 dollars per
year. President Taft wanted to appoint Knox his Secretary of State;
so without formal annnouncement, the administration spokesmen intro-
duced a bill to "roll back" the salary of the Secretary to the pre-exist-
ing level. During the debate on this measure, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Russell wrote its sponsors that this measure would permit the ap-
pointment of a member of the present Senate, "after the 4th of March
next, but prior to the expiration of the -period for which he was elected,
to the Office of Secretary of State.' 0 3 The Assistant Attorney General
reasoned, as discussed earlier, 04 that "the sole purpose" of ,the ineli-
gibility clause is to destroy the expectation of a Senator or Congressman
that he might enjoy "the newly created emolument." But, also, as ex-
pressed earlier,' the purpose of the ineligibility clause has much
deeper and broader roots that go to the very heart of our system of
government.
IV. CONCLUSION
To recapitulate, the men who drafted our Constitution were prac-
tical men, well aware 'that the twin passions of "ambition and avarice;
the love of power and the love of money"' 0 6 might lead to "office hunt-
ing," to "cabal and intrigue between the executive and the legislative
bodies,"' 07 to the "probable abuses" that result when appointment to
high office is "within the gift of -the Executive."'" They agreed that
the Constitution "should lay as few -temptations as possible in the way
of those in power"; 0 9 and that it should "keep distinct the three great
branches of government."" 0 To this end, they agreed that the appoin-
tive power within the Executive should be curbed by making the mem-
bers of both houses ineligible for appointment to other offices. They
disagreed only as to the extent of this necessary limitation.
At one extreme, Patrick Henry would have rendered the Legisla-
102. 43 CoNG. REc. 2402-03 (1909).
103. Id. at 2403; see text accompanying note 7 supra.
104. See text accompanying note 7 supra.
105. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
106. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 284.
107. Id. at 380.
108. See text accompanying notes 21, 22, 26 supra.
109. 2 M. FARAND, supra note 3, at 287.
110. Id. at 393.
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tors ineligible for any other office during and after their terms of elec-
ted service."' At the other, Alexander Hamilton and John Mercer
feared that, without the appointive power and the potential for appeal
to the "ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust,""' 2 the
President might become "a mere phantom of authority.""x 3 The ef-
fort "for preserving the Legislature as pure as possible" by "shutting
the door against appointments" 1 4 ended in a compromise.
Edmund Randolph spoke for the overwhelming majority when,
originally he proposed that the members of both houses be ineligible
for all other offices, but only during their elected term."' Then, as
the debate wore on, it was agreed that the members of both houses
would be eligible for appointment to offices "established by a particular
state";"" would be eligible for appointment as "officers in the army or
navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated"; 1 and finally un-
der the Madison middle ground, eligible for all civil offices established
under the authority of the United States other than those "which may
be created or augmented" during the elected term of office."18 Mem-
bers of the legislative bodies were not to escape this limitation by the
simple act of resignation; and the Framers steadfastly rejected propo-
sals that the members of both houses be eligible at any time for appoint-
ment to any office, provided only that upon acceptance of such office
they "vacate their seats," and that they not receive "any salary, fees,
or emoluments of any kind" in the new office." 9
But why all this fuss over Bill Saxbe? During the confirmation
debate, Senators "from both sides of the aisle" were quick to speak in
favor of their colleague. Even Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina,
who voted against Mr. Saxbe for constitutional reasons, said that "he
thought the nominee was a fine lawyer and very qualified" for the of-
fice of Attorney General. 20
James Madison gave us the answer: "Because, it is proper to take
111. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
112. M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 288.
113. Id. at 284.
114. Id. at 386.
115. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
116. 2 M. FARRAmN, supra note 3, at 386; see note 47 supra.
117. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 3, at 289.
118. See text accompanying notes 24, 57-58 supra.
119. 2 M. FA1AND, supra note 3, at 489-90; see text accompanying notes 40 & 52
supra. See in this connection President Nixon's appointment of Congressman Rumsfeld
to the Directorship of the OEO; paying him no salary for that position, and 42,500 dol-
lars as an "assistant to the President." See note 6 supra.
120. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1973, at 35, col. 6.
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alarm at the first experiment on our liberties."' 21  Or, as Mr. Justice
Bradley wrote almost a century ago about a "little" search and seizure:
'It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first foot-
ing in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure."' 22  Finally, Mr. Justice Brandeis reminds
us that "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficient. . . .Men born
to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
minded rulers . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing."12
3
121. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in Ever-
son v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65 para. 3 (1947) (appendix to dissent of Rut-
ledge, J.).
122. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
123. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis
concluded his famous dissent in that "wiretapping" case with these words:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omni-
present teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its exam-
ple. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds
contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.
Id. at 485.
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